Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
(RIPA) Procedures
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Change Record
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Procedures Title
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Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
(RIPA) Procedures
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Version Number
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V1
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Owner(s)
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Pat Connell
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Author(s)
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Pat Connell
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Approved by
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Effective date
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Renewal date
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Change
Record.
1
1
Introduction.
3
2
Decisions register, records,
retention and destruction.
5
3
Where we cannot use surveillance.
7
4
Communications data and recording telephone
conversations.
8
5
Use of Covert Human
Intelligence Sources (CHIS).
9
6
Directed Surveillance.
11
7
Online covert activity / Use of internet and social
media.
13
8
Rules of evidence.
15
9
Authorisations.
16
10
Judicial approval of RIPA authorisations.
18
11
Senior Responsible Officer’s role.
19
12
Authorising officers.
20
13
Training.
21
14
Authorisation forms.
22
15
Duration of authorisation, reviews and renewals.
23
16
Cancellations and ceasing surveillance activity.
24
17
Codes of practice.
25
18
Officers with designated RIPA roles.
26
19
FLOWCHART - Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS)
Process.
27
20
FLOWCHART - Directed Surveillance Process.
28
21
FLOWCHART - Application to a Justice of the Peace Seeking an
Order to Approve the Grant of a RIPA Authorisation or
Notice.
29
22
AIDE MEMOIRE – Factors to consider in proportionality and
intrusiveness.
30
1.1
Purpose
1.1.1
These
procedures set out a guide to practice for how the councils manage
and record decisions relating to the provisions of The Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) as it relates to covert
surveillance. This must be read in conjunction with the
councils’ RIPA Policy and statutory codes of practice issued
by the Secretary of State and any additional guidance provided by
Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office
(IPCO).
1.1.2
All
references to the Home Office Codes of Practice relate to the
latest versions which were issued in relation to covert
surveillance and covert human intelligence sources, and in relation
to the acquisition and disclosure of Communications Data.
References to the Code of Practice and other relevant Guidance
document relate to the latest version which was issued.
1.2.1
This procedure applies to all
staff and agents working for the councils. Although the councils
may have limited use of the powers under RIPA, it is important that
there is good awareness and knowledge across service teams so that
we do not inadvertently use any approach that may contravene
RIPA.
1.3
Background
1.3.1
The main purpose of the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (“the Act”)
is to ensure that public bodies use their investigatory powers in
accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998.
1.3.2
The investigatory powers
covered by the legislation are:
(a)
intrusive surveillance
(on resident premises/in private vehicles) (NB: The
councils are not permitted to engage in intrusive
surveillance)
(b)
covert surveillance in
the course of specific operations
(c)
the use of covert
human intelligence sources (agents, informants, undercover
officers)
1.3.3
For each of these powers the
Act ensures that the law clearly covers the purposes for which they
may be used, which authorities can use the powers, who should
authorise each use of power, the use that can be made of the
material gained, independent judicial oversight and a means of
redress for any individual aggrieved by use of the
powers.
1.3.4
All investigations or
enforcement actions involving covert surveillance or the use of a
CHIS must comply with the provisions of RIPA. The consequence of
not obtaining an authorisation and approval under the Act may be
that the action is in breach of the Human Rights Act and that any
evidence so gained could be excluded in any proceedings that
arise.
1.4 Some
definitions
1.4.1
“Covert” Concealed, done secretly.
1.4.2
“Covert
surveillance” Surveillance which is carried out in a manner calculated to
ensure that the persons subject to the surveillance are unaware
that it is or may be taking place.
1.4.3
“Directed
surveillance”
Surveillance, which is covert, but not intrusive, and is
undertaken for the purposes of a specific investigation or specific
operation, in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining
of private information about a person (whether or not one
specifically identified for the purposes of the investigation or
operation) and otherwise than by way of an immediate response to
events or circumstances, the nature of which is such that it would
not be reasonably practicable for an authorisation under Part II of
the Act to be sought for the carrying out of the
surveillance.
1.4.4
“Intrusive
surveillance” Is covert surveillance that is carried out in relation to
anything taking place on any residential premises or in any private
vehicle and involves the presence of an individual on the premises
or in the vehicle or is carried out by means of a surveillance
device.
1.4.5
“Private
information” Includes any information relating to a person’s
private or family life. Private information should be taken
generally to include any aspect of a person’s private or
personal relationship with others, including family and
professional or business relationships.
1.4.6
“Confidential
Information” Confidential information consists of communications subject
to legal privilege, communications between a Member of Parliament
and another person on constituency matters, confidential personal
information, or confidential journalistic material.
2.1.1
The register and all associated
documents relating to authorisations and approvals, reviews,
cancellations, or renewals and refused applications should be
retained in an auditable format, with each particular authorisation
and approval allocated a unique reference number cross referenced
to a unique reference number for that particular investigation or
activity.
2.2
Decisions register
2.2.1
A central register of RIPA
authorisations will be maintained by the council’s Head of
Legal and Democratic, who is the council’s Senior Responsible
Officer for the purpose of ensuring the integrity of the
council’s RIPA processes under the Act, and statutory
guidance issued in pursuance of the Act.
2.2.2
Day to day maintenance of the
register and advice relating to RIPA issues is undertaken under the
supervision of the Senior Responsible Officer by the
council’s Deputy Head of Legal (Operational), in the role of
RIPA Coordinating Officer.
2.2.3
All officers should ensure that
original signed documents are given to the RIPA Coordinating
Officer (or in case of absence to another lawyer in the legal
services team) upon issue in order to keep this register up to
date. On receipt of a document to be included within the register,
a date for review will be diarised.
2.3
Records
2.3.1 Records
should be retained for a period of at least three years from the
ending of the authorisation and should contain information as
specified in the Code of Practice
2.4
Retention and destruction of results of investigations
2.4.1
Material obtained in the course
of criminal investigations and which may be relevant to the
investigation must be recorded and retained in accordance with the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
2.4.2
The councils must have in place
arrangements for handling, storage and destruction of material
obtained through the use of covert surveillance and compliance with
the appropriate data protection requirements must be
ensured.
2.4.3
Decisions on requests for
judicial approval, authorisations, requests for authorisation,
renewals, and cancellations are confidential material. The
documents and any information contained therein must not be
disclosed to any person who has no legitimate need to have access
to the document, or to the information that it
contains.
2.4.4
Authorising Officers must
ensure that there are proper arrangements within their departments
or services for the retention and security of such documents in
accordance with the requirements of the current data protection
legislation.
2.4.5
Such documents may need to be
securely kept for a period (considered appropriate by the relevant
head of service) following the completion of any surveillance, as
they may have to be produced in court, or to the other party in
court proceedings as part of legal disclosure requirements.
Superfluous copies should not be made or kept.
3.1.1
There are some instances where
surveillance is not permissible in any circumstances.
3.2
Intrusive Surveillance.
3.2.1
This is covert surveillance
carried out in relation to anything taking place on residential
premises or in any private vehicle, whether by way of a person or
device. It will also be intrusive surveillance where a device
placed outside consistently provides information of the same or
equivalent quality and detail, as might be expected if it were in
the premises or vehicle.
3.2.2
Residential premises are any
part of premises occupied for residential purposes or living
accommodation, including hotel rooms or prison cells. However, it
does not include common areas in blocks of flats and similar
premises.
3.2.3
Private vehicle is a vehicle
used primarily for private purposes by the owner or person entitled
to use it.
3.3 Use
of Children to gather information about parent/ guardian
3.3.1
Authorisation may not be
granted for the conduct or use of a source under the age of sixteen
where it is intended that the purpose is to obtain information
about their parent or any person who has parental responsibility
for them.
3.4
Vulnerable Individuals
3.4.1
A vulnerable individual is a
person who is, or may be, in need of community care services by
reason of mental or other disability, age or illness and who is or
may be unable to take care of themselves, or unable to protect
themselves against significant harm or exploitation. Where it is
known or suspected that an individual may be vulnerable, they will
only be authorised as a CHIS in the most exceptional of
circumstances.
4.1.1
See details in section 10 of
the RIPA policy which covers acquisition and disclosure of
communications data. Local authorities are able to access certain
types of communications data for the purpose of preventing or
detecting serious crime or preventing or detecting crime or
preventing disorder.
4.1.2
Applications no longer need
Magistrate or Justice of the Peace approval, but must be processed
through the National Anti- Fraud Network (NAFN), who will consider
the application prior to submitting this for approval to the Office
for Communications Data Authorisations
(‘OCDA’).
4.2
Recording telephone conversations covertly
4.2.1
Council staff are not permitted
to covertly record telephone conversations as such a covert
activity is outside the powers of a Local Authority.
5.1.1
The use of a covert human
intelligence source (CHIS), and his or her conduct, would require
authorisation under RIPA. In practice, it is unlikely that there
will be any circumstances which would require the council to either
use a CHIS or operate under cover in the manner of a CHIS, and
advice should be sought from the RIPA Coordinating Officer or the
Senior Responsible Officer before any authorisation is applied for
or granted.
5.1.2
Further detail for the process
is set out in the flowchart in section 19.
5.1.3
A CHIS is defined as the use or
conduct of an individual who establishes or maintains a personal or
other relationship with a person for the covert purpose of
obtaining information. These provisions would cover the use of
professional witnesses to obtain evidence or information, or
officers operating ‘under cover’. Great caution should
be exercised in these circumstances and the authorising officer
must be satisfied that the authorisation is necessary, that the
conduct authorised is proportionate to what is sought to be
achieved and that arrangements for the overall management and
control of the individual are in force.
5.1.4
The provisions of RIPA relating
to CHIS do not apply where a situation would not normally require a
relationship to be established for the covert purpose of obtaining
information. For example: where members of the public volunteer
information to the council as part of their normal civic duties; or
where members of the public are asked to keep diaries of incidents
in relation to, say, planning enforcement, anti-social behaviour or
noise nuisance.
5.1.5
If a CHIS is used, both the use
of the CHIS and his or her conduct require prior
authorisation.
5.1.6
Where engaged, the Home Office
Code of Practice on Covert Human Intelligence Sources (2018)
requires public authorities to ensure that arrangements are in
place for the proper oversight and management of CHIS, including
appointing individual officers as defined in the Act for each CHIS.
This is known as a ‘handler’ and the officer will have
day to day responsibility for dealing with the CHIS on behalf of
the authority concerned; directing the day to day activities of the
CHIS; recording the information supplied by the CHIS; and
monitoring the security and welfare of the CHIS.
5.1.7
The handler of a CHIS will
usually be of a rank or position below that of the Authorising
Officer.
5.1.8
In addition to a handler, a
‘controller’ will also be appointed. This officer will
be responsible for the management and supervision of the handler
and general oversight of the use of the CHIS.
5.1.9
In view of the rigorous nature
and importance of these requirements it is essential that CHIS
activity is not undertaken by or on behalf of the council except
under the strict control and supervision of officers who have been
properly and recently trained for the specific purpose.
6.1.1
As this activity is the most
likely to be carried out, this procedure addresses this activity in
more detail. Where there is to be directed surveillance written
authorisation must be obtained in accordance with the provisions of
RIPA before the surveillance commences.
6.1.2
Further detail for the process
is set out in the flowchart in section 20.
6.1.3
Directed surveillance is
defined as surveillance which is covert, but not intrusive and
which is undertaken for the purposes of a specific investigation,
and which is likely to result in obtaining private information
about a person and which is carried out otherwise than as an
immediate response to events where it would be impracticable to
obtain prior authorisation. Therefore, investigating officers need
to consider a number of key questions to determine whether a
proposed activity falls within this definition of directed
surveillance:
6.2 Is
the proposed activity surveillance?
6.2.1
“Surveillance”
includes:
·
monitoring, observing,
listening to persons, watching or following their movements,
listening to their conversations or their other activities or
communications
·
recording anything
monitored, observed or listened to in the course of
surveillance
·
Surveillance by, or
with, the assistance of a surveillance device, which will include
cameras, video, and listening or recording devices.
6.3 Is
the surveillance covert?
6.3.1
Surveillance is covert where it
is carried out in a manner calculated to ensure that the subjects
of the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place.
It is therefore the intention of the officer carrying out the
surveillance which is relevant to this issue of
covertness.
6.4 Is
the surveillance for the purposes of a specific investigation?
6.4.1
General observation, not
forming part of any investigation into suspected breaches of the
law and not directed against any specific person or persons is not
directed surveillance e.g. CCTV cameras in council car parks are
readily visible and if they are used to monitor the general
activities of what is happening within the car park, it falls
outside the definition.
6.4.2
If, however, the cameras are
targeting a particular known individual, the usage will become a
specific operation which will require authorisation.
6.5 Is
the surveillance undertaken in such a manner that is likely to
result in the obtaining of private information about a person?
6.5.1
“Private
information” is any information concerning a person’s
private or family life. Whether information is personal in nature
is relevant when deciding whether information is
private.
6.5.2
The fact that observation of
individuals occurs from the public highway will not prevent the
discovery of private information.
6.5.3
When officers consider this
question they should give due weight to the probability of
discovering such information, as authorisation is not required if
there is only a slight possibility of discovering private
information.
6.6 Is
the surveillance otherwise than by way of an immediate response to
events or circumstances where it is not reasonably practicable to
obtain prior authorisation?
6.6.1
If the surveillance is an
immediate response to something happening during the course of an
officer’s work, it would not be reasonable to obtain prior
authority. If this occurs, the officer must report the incident
back to an authorising officer so a note can be made on the
relevant department file and the central register.
6.7 Is
the surveillance intrusive?
6.7.1
The council is not authorised
to carry out intrusive surveillance, but in any event it is
extremely unlikely that the council would contemplate undertaking
this activity.
6.7.2
Surveillance is intrusive
surveillance if it is carried out covertly in relation to anything
taking place on residential premises or in a private vehicle and
involves the presence of an individual on the premises or in the
vehicle or is carried out by a surveillance device.
7.1.1
Although social networking and
internet sites are easily accessible, if they are going to be used
during the course of an investigation, consideration must be given
about whether a RIPA authorisation should be obtained.
7.1.2
Viewing of open-source material
does not require authorisation unless and until it is repeated or
systematic, at which stage directed surveillance authorisation
should be considered.
7.1.3
Passing an access control so as
to look deeper into the site, for example by making a ‘friend
request’, requires at least directed surveillance
authorisation. If the investigator is to go further and
pursue enquiries within the site, thereby establishing a
relationship with the site host in the guise of a member of the
public, this requires CHIS authorisation.
7.1.5
In deciding whether online
surveillance should be regarded as covert, consideration should be
given to the likelihood of the subject(s) knowing that the
surveillance is or may be taking place. Use of the internet itself
may be considered as adopting a surveillance technique calculated
to ensure that the subject is unaware of it, even if no further
steps are taken to conceal the activity. Conversely, where the
council may have taken reasonable steps to inform the public or
particular individuals that the surveillance is or may be taking
place, the activity may be regarded as overt and a directed
surveillance authorisation will not normally be available
(required).
7.1.6
Depending on the nature of the
online platform, there may be a reduced expectation of privacy
where information relating to a person or group of people is made
openly available within the public domain, however in some
circumstances privacy implications still apply. This is because the
intention when making such information available was not for it to
be used for a covert purpose such as investigative activity. This
is regardless of whether a user of a website or social media
platform has sought to protect such information by restricting its
access by activating privacy settings.
7.1.7
Where information about an
individual is placed on a publicly accessible database, for example
the telephone directory or Companies House, they are unlikely to
have any reasonable expectation of privacy over the monitoring by
public authorities of that information. Individuals who post
information on social media networks and other websites whose
purpose is to communicate messages to a wide audience are also less
likely to hold a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to
that information.
7.1.8
Whether there may be
interference with a person’s private life includes a
consideration of the nature of the councils’ activity in
relation to that information. Simple reconnaissance of such sites
(i.e. preliminary examination with a view to establishing whether
the site or its contents are of interest) is unlikely to interfere
with a person’s reasonably held expectation of privacy and
therefore is not likely to require a directed surveillance
authorisation. But where there is systematic collection and
recording of information about a particular person or group, a
directed surveillance authorisation should be
considered.
7.1.9
In order to determine whether a
directed surveillance authorisation should be sought for accessing
information on a website as part of a covert investigation or
operation, it is necessary to look at the intended purpose and
scope of the online activity it is proposed to undertake. Factors
that should be considered in establishing whether a directed
surveillance authorisation is required include:
·
Whether the investigation or
research is directed towards an individual or group;
·
Whether it is likely to result
in obtaining private information about a person or group of
people;
·
Whether it is likely to involve
visiting internet sites to build up an intelligence picture or
profile;
·
Whether the information
obtained will be recorded and retained;
·
Whether the information is
likely to provide an observer with a pattern of
lifestyle;
·
Whether the information is
being combined with other sources of information or intelligence,
which amounts to information relating to a person’s private
life;
·
Whether the investigation or
research is part of an ongoing piece of work involving repeated
viewing of the subject(s);
·
Whether it is likely to involve
identifying and recording information about third parties, such as
friends and family members of the subject of interest, or
information posted by third parties, that may include personal
information and therefore constitute collateral intrusion into the
privacy of these third parties.
8.1.1
Material obtained through
covert surveillance may be used as evidence in criminal
proceedings. Provided that surveillance has been properly
authorised, the evidence gathered should be admissible under law
and in accordance with Section 78 of the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984 and the Human Rights Act 1998.
8.1.2
Material gathered as a result
of surveillance authorised under the Act is subject to the ordinary
rules for retention and disclosure of material and the Criminal
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
9.1.1
Authorisation must be given in
writing.
9.1.2
Authorising officers should not
ordinarily give authorisations in investigations or operations in
which they are directly involved unless this is
unavoidable.
9.1.3
No Authorising Officer shall
grant an authorisation for the carrying out of directed
surveillance or the use of a CHIS unless they believe:
a) that an authorisation is necessary for the
purpose of preventing or detecting crime, and in the case of
directed surveillance that the offence in question carries a
maximum sentence of at least six months imprisonment or relates to
the sale of alcohol or tobacco to persons who are underage;
and
b) the authorised activity is proportionate
to what is sought to be achieved by carrying it out.
9.1.4
The contemplated activity must
be considered necessary in the particular circumstances of the
case. Authorisation can
only be granted where there is justifiable interference with
an individual’s human rights, i.e. it is necessary and
proportionate for surveillance activities to take place
9.1.5
Proportionality is a key
concept of RIPA. An authorisation should demonstrate how an
authorising officer has reached the conclusion that the
surveillance activity is proportionate to what it seeks to achieve,
including an explanation of the reasons why the method, tactic or
technique is not disproportionate (the proverbial
‘sledgehammer to crack a nut’).
9.1.6
Proportionality is not only
about balancing the effectiveness of covert methods over overt
methods but of explaining why the particular covert method, tactic
or technique is the least intrusive. It is insufficient to make a
simple assertion or to say that the ‘seriousness’ of
the crime justifies any or every method available. It may be
unacceptable to advance lack of resources or a potential cost
saving as sufficient ground to use technological solutions which
can be more intrusive than a human being. This critical judgment
can only properly be reached once all other aspects of
authorisation have been fully considered.
9.1.7
An aide memoire for factors to
consider in proportionality and intrusiveness is included in
section 22.
9.1.8
Before authorising surveillance, the authorising officer must also
take into account the risk of intrusion into the privacy of persons
other than those who are the target of the investigation.
This is known as collateral intrusion. The authorisation
procedures allow for an assessment of collateral intrusion which
the authorising officer will be required to consider prior to
granting authorisation. In order to decide whether to grant
authorisation the authorising officer must have a full picture of
the operation, the proposed method(s) of observation and the Human
Rights Act implications of the operation.
9.1.9
A potential model authorisation
would make clear that the following elements of proportionality had
been fully considered:
a) balancing the size and scope of the
operation against the gravity and extent of the perceived
mischief,
b) explaining how and why the methods to be
adopted will cause the least possible intrusion on the target and
others,
c) that the activity is an appropriate use of
the legislation and the only reasonable way, having considered all
others, of obtaining the necessary result, and
d) providing evidence of other methods and
why they were not implemented.
9.1.10
At the point in time
immediately before the completion of the application for a RIPA
authorisation and before it is presented to the Authorising Officer
for his/her authorisation, the application should be delivered to
the RIPA Coordinating Officer. This is to assist with the
completion of the central record of authorisations and to provide
for an additional element of ‘quality control’ over the
content of the application. Assuming it is granted by the
Authorising Officer, the completed authorisation should also be
returned to the RIPA Coordinating Officer and again assessed for
quality before arrangements are made for a Magistrates Court to
consider its approval (see the judicial approval section
below).
10.1.1
In addition to the
pre-conditions and requirements for authorisations described above,
no authorisation for directed surveillance or the use of a CHIS
will take effect unless and until the relevant judicial authority
(i.e., a Magistrate) has made an order approving the grant of the
authorisation. It is therefore vital that any surveillance for
which authorisation has been sought does not start until such time
as it has been approved by a Magistrate.
10.1.2
It is necessary for the council
to obtain judicial approval for all initial RIPA
authorisations/applications and renewals. There is no requirement
for a Magistrate to consider either cancellations or internal
reviews.
10.1.3
The need for judicial approval
from a Magistrate will require the RIPA Coordinating Officer or
another lawyer under their supervision to contact the
administration section at the local Magistrates Court to request a
hearing for this stage of the authorisation. In advance of the
hearing, the Authorising Officer should provide to the court the
RIPA authorisation signed by him/her and a completed judicial
application/order form, together with any other relevant supporting
documents. The hearing to consider the application will be held in
private, and the Magistrate will consider the documentation
provided, and ask questions to clarify points or gain reassurance
on any matters of interest or concern. Ordinarily, the person
representing the council at this hearing will be the Authorising
Officer, and this person should make sure that s/he takes to the
hearing evidence of his/her own authorisation to grant
authorisations and represent the council in court
proceedings.
10.1.4
The judicial approval process
is set out in the workflow in section 21, guidance and
approval/order forms can be found on the
Gov.uk website.
11.1.1
The Council’s Senior
Responsible Officer (SRO) is the Head of Legal and Democratic. The
SRO is responsible for:
·
The integrity of the process in
place within the councils for the management of Covert Human
Intelligence Sources and Directed Surveillance
·
Compliance with Part II of RIPA
and the Codes of Practice
·
Oversight of the reporting of
errors to the relevant oversight Commissioner and the
identification of both the cause(s) of errors and the
implementation of processes to minimise repetition of
errors
·
Engagement with the
Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO) inspectors
when they conduct their inspections
·
Oversight of the implementation
of any post-inspection action plan approved by the IPCO
·
Ensuring that all Authorising
Officers are of an appropriate standard in light of any
recommendations in the inspection reports by the Investigatory
Powers Commissioner’s Office.
·
Presenting the policy on an
annual basis to the Joint Audit and Governance Committee for
review
11.2
Specific responsibilities
11.2.1
Submitting annual statistics to
the IPCO in relation to authorisations.
11.2.2
Communicating to the IPCO any
unauthorised activity that might come to the attention of the
authority. This must be done within 5 working days. The records,
documentation, and associated documentation relating to this
unauthorised activity must be retained by the Senior Responsible
Officer and disclosed to the IPCO upon request, and certainly to an
inspector from the IPCO at the commencement of the next scheduled
inspection.
11.2.3 Ensuring
a central register of authorisations and approvals is maintained.
This is actioned through the RIPA Co-ordinator,
12.1.1
The Regulation of Investigatory
Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence
Sources) Order 2010 No 521 prescribes the Authorising Officer must
be at least a director, head of service, service manager or
equivalent.
12.1.2
Under the constitution’s
scheme of delegation, heads of service and the Chief Executive have
delegated authority to issue RIPA authorisations, however further
important provisions about Authorising Officers and about training
are contained in section 7 below. For a service manager to become
an Authorising Officer, a written authority must be produced by the
relevant head of service.
12.1.3
The Authorising Officer should
not be part of the surveillance team. S/he cannot grant a
self-authorisation, and in the event that a head of service wishes
to undertake the surveillance personally, or as part of the
surveillance team, any authority should be issued by a different
Authorising Officer.
12.1.4
Authorising Officers must be
aware of the requirements of RIPA and how to properly consider
requests for authority. Authorising Officers must demonstrate that
these requests have been properly considered when they complete the
authorisation form.
12.1.5
Where the surveillance is
likely to lead to the obtaining of “confidential
information” (as defined below), a RIPA authorisation can
only be given by the Chief Executive (or in his absence, his
deputy). For these purposes confidential information has the
following specific meaning, namely:
a) legally privileged information
e.g. communications between a professional legal adviser and a
client
b) confidential personal information,
which is information kept in confidence and relating to a
person’s physical or mental health or relating to spiritual
counselling given to a person e.g. consultations between a health
professional and a patient, information from a patient’s
medical records or conversations between an individual and a
Minister of Religion
c) confidential journalistic
information, held for the purposes of journalism on the basis that
it or its source would not be revealed.
12.1.6
It is difficult to envisage
circumstances in which the council’s investigative activities
would either require, justify or otherwise result in the obtaining
of confidential information and if any such information is obtained
during surveillance, legal advice should be sought
immediately.
13.1.1
The council will ensure that
adequate training takes place for Authorising Officers and
investigating officers. Such training may be arranged and provided
through officers’ own professional associations or through
the use of outside agencies.
13.1.2
Sharing training with other
local authorities may also be appropriate. The council’s
legal services team can also assist with training and by giving
guidance from time to time, either generally as
legislation/guidance evolves or in specific cases.
13.1.3
As it is especially important
for Authorising Officers to be able to demonstrate an up to date
knowledge of RIPA and best practice, the delegation to grant
authorisations should generally be exercised only by those officers
who have undertaken and kept up to date RIPA training.
13.1.4
In order to assist this
process, the Council’s RIPA Coordinating Officer under the
general supervision of the Senior Responsible Officer for RIPA will
maintain, monitor and review a central record of RIPA training
attended by officers of the council along with a list of those
officers who have undertaken training necessary to enable them to
assess and grant authorisations.
13.1.5
It should further be noted that
advice from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office
(IPCO) is that officers engaged in RIPA activity and/or management
should receive training appropriate to their roles at approximately
18 month intervals.
14.1.1
RIPA itself does not contain
prescribed forms of authorisation. However, the adapted Home Office
model forms referred to below should be used. This will ensure a
consistent approach is adopted across service teams and ensure all
relevant issues are addressed during the decision-making
process.
14.2
Forms for directed surveillance:
14.3
Forms for CHIS:
·
Application for the
use of CHIS
·
Reviewing the use of
CHIS
·
Renewal of
authorisation to use CHIS
·
Cancellation of
CHIS
15.1 Duration of
authorisation
15.1.1
A written authorisation for
directed surveillance ceases to have effect unless renewed and
approved at the end of a period of three months beginning from the
date on which it took effect (12 months in the case of a CHIS
authorisation).
15.1.2
Officers should ensure
authorisations only last for as long as is considered necessary and
proportionate.
15.2 Reviews
15.2.1
Regular reviews of
authorisations should be undertaken to assess the need for the
surveillance to continue. It is the responsibility of the
Authorising Officer to determine how often a review should take
place and this should be as frequently as is considered necessary
and practicable. The frequency of reviews must be specified on the
authorisation form.
15.2.2
The results of a review should
be recorded in the central record of authorisations.
Particular attention should be paid to reviews where the
surveillance provides access to confidential information or
involves collateral intrusion.
15.3 Renewals
15.3.1
If at any time before an
authorisation would cease to have effect the Authorising Officer
considers it necessary for the authorisation to continue for the
purpose of which it was given, they may renew it in writing for a
further period of three months.
15.3.2
Magistrate approval, if
necessary, must then be obtained prior to expiry of the original
authorisation in order for activity to continue.
15.3.3
Any time before the
authorisation would cease to have effect, the Authorising Officer
may renew, in writing, it is still considered
necessary.
15.3.4
Authorisations may be renewed
more than once provided they continue to meet the criteria for
authorisations. The renewal does not have to be authorised by the
same authorising officer who granted the original
authorisation.
15.3.5
The Authorising Officer who
granted the authorisation or last renewed the authorisation must
cancel it if satisfied the directed surveillance no longer meets
the criteria upon which it was authorised.
15.3.6
Renewal records should be kept
as part of the central record of authorisations.
16.1
Cancellations
16.1.1
The authorising officer who
granted or last renewed the authorisation must cancel it as soon as
it no longer meets the criteria for which it was originally
authorised. In any event, it will expire after 3 months (12
months for CHIS).
16.1.2
Where the authorising officer
is no longer available the person who is taking over that role will
be responsible.
16.2
Ceasing surveillance activity
16.2.1
As soon as the decision to
cease directed surveillance is taken, all those involved must be
directed to stop surveillance of the subject.
16.2.2
The date and time when such an
instruction was given should be recorded in the central record of
authorisations and the notification of cancellation where
relevant.
17.1.2
These codes are available on
the Gov.uk
website and should be read by investigating officers and team
leaders whose investigations may involve covert
surveillance.
17.1.3
The codes of practice are
admissible as evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. The
councils will normally follow the requirements of codes of practice
issued by the Home Secretary unless there are exceptional
circumstances justifying a departure from the recommended
approach.
17.1.4
The IPCO also produces guidance
from time to time on procedures and oversight arrangements for
local councils on RIPA and its website offers a further valuable
reference source.
18.1
Senior Responsible Officer
18.1.1
Head of Legal and
Democratic
18.2
RIPA Co-ordinating Officer
18.2.1
Deputy Head of Legal
(Operational)
18.3
Authorising officers
18.3.1
Deputy Chief Executive -
Partnerships